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Abstract— The unique identities of remote sensing, monitoring, self-actuating, self–adapting and self-configuring “things” in Internet 
of Things (IoT) has come out as fundamental building blocks for the development of “smart environments”. This experience has 
begun to be felt across different IoT-based domains like healthcare, surveillance, energy systems, home appliances, industrial 
machines, smart grids and smart cities. These developments have, however, brought about a more complex and heterogeneous 
environment which is slowly becoming a home to cyber attackers. Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) though can be employed as a 
mechanism for maximizing the potential use of digital evidence while minimizing the cost of conducting a digital forensic investigation 
process in IoT environments in case of an incidence. The problem addressed in this paper, therefore, is that at the time of writing this 
paper, there still exist no IoT architectures that have a DFR capability that is able to attain incident preparedness across IoT 
environments as a mechanism of preparing for post-event response process. It is on this premise, that the authors are proposing an 
architecture for incorporating DFR to IoT domain for proper planning and preparing in the case of security incidents. It is 
paramount to note that the DFR mechanism in IoT discussed in this paper complies with ISO/IEC 27043: 2015, 27030:2012 and 
27017: 2015 international standards. It is the authors’ opinion that the architecture is holistic and very significant in IoT forensics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world is currently experiencing a transformation, and 
at the same time, it is being ushered into a new error of 
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies. With these 
transformations, many solutions to existing problems will, 
therefore, depend on fairly complex architectures [1].  It is 
for this reason that the European Lighthouse Integrated 
Project on the IoT Architecture [2] did address for three 
years the Internet-of-Things Architecture, and created the 
proposed architectural reference model together with the 
definition of an initial set of key building blocks. Together 
the key building blocks are envisioned as foundations that 
have fostered the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
[2].  
These initiatives in the IoT domain, however, necessitate 
the creation of applications and services by exploiting 
existing physical things. This, further, creates a more 
complex and heterogeneous environment which is slowly 
becoming a home to cybercriminals. As a way to counter the 
cyber-attacks as well as maximize the potential use of digital 
evidence while minimizing the cost of conducting a digital 
forensic process in IoT environments; Digital Forensic 
Readiness (DFR) therefore becomes inevitable in existing 
IoT environments. Nevertheless, these aspects can also be 
backed by the top 10 predictions by the International Data 
Corporation (IDC) [3]. IDC foresees that the growth of IoT 
will be driven by industries and until 2020 it will grow by a 
double digit. Nevertheless, a projection on global spending 
of IoT has been estimated to reach $1.29 trillion by 2020 
with “smart home” investments projected to reach $63 
billion [3]. This, among other predictions, has shown that 
IoT is the hot buzzword at the time of writing this paper and 
therefore the need to come up with proactive and 
standardized approaches that can help to fight cyber-related 
incidents. 
In this paper, therefore, the authors propose an 
architecture with the forensic capability of incorporating 
DFR to the IoT domain for proper planning and preparing 
for potential security incidents in IoT environments. The 
primary problem addressed in this study can, therefore, be 
stated as that: at the time of writing this paper, there still 
existed no IoT architecture or frameworks that have a 
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capability of incorporating DFR in order to help attain 
incident preparedness in IoT environments. 
The main focus of this research paper is, therefore, to 
present the architecture in the best way possible such that the 
IoT environments are able to be forensically prepared for 
digital investigations. The paper is presented in three folds. 
Firstly, a high-level of the architecture is presented, which is 
thereafter followed by a detailed architecture. Later, a 
hypothetical scenario that addresses the lack of the proposed 
processes in the architecture is presented. The case scenario 
has been used as a basis that outlines the impacts of lacking 
DFR in a given environment and the benefit when the 
architecture is employed. 
As for the remainder of this paper, Section II presents 
reviews on materials and methods.  Thereafter, Section III 
presents the results and discussion of the proposed 
Architecture for Adding DFR to the IoT Domain, and finally, 
Section IV concludes the research work and mentions a 
possible future work. The next section briefs the reader on 
the materials and methods used. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
In this section, the authors present a background review of 
Digital Forensics (DF), Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR), 
IoT Domain and Architecture (IDA). DF is discussed to 
show how forensics as science can be used to gather Digital 
Forensic Evidence (DFE) to be used in both for legal or civil 
proceedings. DFR is discussed to show the proactive side of 
DF, IDA is discussed to show a new technology that is being 
adopted by a majority of organisations to provide 
interconnectivity of devices, which makes it possible to 
collect, process, and analyse data from almost every object. 
A. Digital Forensics 
Digital Forensics (DF) as discussed by Karie and venter 
[4] is a growing field that is gaining popularity among many 
computer professionals, Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), 
forensic practitioners, and other stakeholders who must 
always cooperate. According to Desai et al., [5], this field 
has become very important due to the increase in digital 
crimes. In the context of this paper, the goal of DF is to 
examine digital media in a forensically sound manner but 
with additional standardised guidelines [6] and trusted 
procedures designed to create legal audit trails [4]. 
In a growing field like DF, developing practical 
methodologies and specifications for different areas of 
application is thus essential and as important as the research 
itself [7]. It is on these grounds that the authors in this paper 
are proposing the inclusion of DFR as a security component 
to the IoT domain. Based on the aspects mentioned 
beforehand, the next section explains the concept of DFR. 
B. Digital Forensic Readiness 
DFR, as discussed by Mohay [8], is the extent to which 
computer systems or computer networks record activities 
and data. This is done in such a manner that the records are 
sufficient to their extent for subsequent forensic purposes, 
and the records are acceptable in terms of their perceived 
authenticity as evidence in subsequent forensic 
investigations. However, Cobb [9] adds that DFR sounds 
like a daunting challenge to many organizations today. As a 
matter of fact, the emergence of the IoT environments has 
brought about a more complex and heterogeneous 
environment which is slowly becoming home to cyber 
attackers. For this reason, it is necessary for organizations to 
have some form of forensic readiness so as to help them in 
planning and preparing for potential cybersecurity incidents. 
This scenario has motivated this research hence the need to 
incorporate DFR as a security component to the IoT domain.  
DFR as a process has also been explained in the ISO/IEC 
27043:2015 standard as a process that occurs before incident 
identification and involves the collection, preservation, 
storage, and analysis of digital evidence [6]. ISO/IEC 27043 
is an international standard for Information Technology-
Security Techniques-Incident Investigation Principles and 
Processes. An overview of the readiness processes as 
discussed in the ISO/IEC 27043 standard is briefly explained 
in the section to follow. 
 
Fig. 1  Readiness processes groups (Source [6]) 
The readiness processes include the class of processes 
dealing with setting up an organization in such a way that, in 
the case that a digital forensic investigation is required, such 
an organization possesses the ability to maximize its 
potential to use digital evidence whilst minimizing the time 
and costs of an investigation. This class of processes is 
optional to the digital investigation processes and is affected 
by an organization rather than the investigator(s). The aims 
for having DFR processes in organizations as stated in the 
ISO/IEC 27043 [6] include: 
• To maximize the potential use of digital evidence; 
• To minimize the costs of digital investigations incurred 
either directly onto the organization’s system, or 
related to the system’s services; 
• To minimize interference with and prevent interruption 
of the organization’s business processes; 
• To preserve or improve the current level of information 
security of systems within the organisation. 
 
Fig. 1 depicts the readiness process groups as described in 
the ISO/IEC 27043. These process groups include planning 
processes group, implementation processes group and the 
assessment processes group.   
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The planning processes group includes all readiness 
processes that are concerned with planning activities, 
including scenario definition, identification of PDE sources, 
planning pre-incident collection, storage and handling of 
data representing PDE, planning pre-incident analysis of 
data representing PDE, planning incident detection, and 
defining system architecture. 
The implementation processes group includes the 
following readiness processes: implementing system 
architecture, implementing pre-incident collection, storage 
and handling of data representing PDE, implementing pre-
incident analyses of data representing PDE and 
implementing incident detection. These processes are 
concerned with the implementation of the results of the 
planning processes. 
Finally, the assessment processes group includes two 
readiness processes: assessment of implementation and 
implementation of assessment results. For a detailed 
explanation of all the DFR processes and sub-process, we 
refer the reader to the ISO/IEC 27043. The next section 
explains the IoT Domain and Architecture. 
C. IoT Domain and Architecture 
With the dynamism of modern technology, the IoT 
domain is bound to accommodate a wide range of 
technologies including but not limited to: stateless and 
stateful technologies, extremely constrained as well as 
unconstrained technologies, hard real-time and soft real-time 
technologies among others. For this reason, single reference 
architecture may not be used as a representation for all 
possible implementations. While a reference model can 
probably be identified, it is likely that several reference 
architectures will co-exist in the IoT domain. 
The word architecture is used in this paper to mean: a 
framework for the specification of a network's physical 
components and their functional organization and 
configuration, its operational principles and procedures, as 
well as data formats used in its operation. 
To deliver an end-to-end IoT solution, as stated by Emil 
[10], architectures will, therefore, require smooth 
interoperability across the different technology domains. 
Some of the technology domains which also comprise a 
specific set of products, services, and skills are briefly 
explained below [10]: 
 
1) The Device Domain: This domain encompasses 
connected assets including sensors, devices, and modules. 
 
2) The Local Network Domain: This domain includes 
connectivity technologies enabling internal transfer of data 
from sensors and devices to other devices or a local network 
gateway. 
 
3) The Wide Area Network Domain: This domain 
contains connectivity technologies enabling the transfer of 
data directly from devices or local network gateways to 
external service enablement domain. 
 
4) The Service Enablement Domain: This domain has 
platforms and middleware. 
 
5) The Applications And Data Domain: This domain is 
all about provisioning, development, storage, and 
management of applications and data. 
6) The Enterprise Systems Domain: This domain has the 
back-end enterprise/ corporate systems. 
 
It is important to note at this point that, the configuration 
of the named domains may change from use-case to use-case. 
However, whatever the use-case, organizations have the 
responsibility to identify the tools and enablers which make 
implementing IoT solutions across these domains easy and 
simple. The next section explains the related work in this 
paper.  
D. Related Work 
Although research on IoT is currently on the rise, there is, 
however, little research focus as at the time of conducting 
this study on architectures that incorporating DFR to IoT 
environments. Some of the existing literature has mentioned 
the DFR process explicitly, while others have the DFR 
process as an implicit process, however, most of them have 
shown the necessity for a DFR process in the emerging IoT 
environments. In this section of the paper, therefore, a 
summary of some of the most prominent efforts in previous 
research work is presented. 
In a paper by Mohamed et al., [11] a description is given 
about a comprehensive approach to identifying the factors 
that contribute to DFR and how these factors work together 
to achieve forensic readiness in an organization. In this 
research, a conceptual framework for organizational forensic 
readiness was developed, and a future work towards the 
empirical validation and refinement of the framework was 
defined. However, this framework did not have a focus on 
DFR in IoT environments that could allow proper planning 
and preparing for potential cyber security incidents as is the 
case of the current paper. 
In another presentation, Groble and Louwrens [12] argue 
that, in a world where cyber-crime is constantly increasing 
and pervasive computing is on the rise, information is 
becoming the most sought-after commodity in the world 
today, thus, making effective and efficient information 
security architecture programs is essential. For this reason, 
the authors then examine the overlap between DF and 
information security, to determine the relevance of DFR to 
information security and propose the inclusion of certain 
aspects of DFR as a component for best practice for 
information security with a focus to IoT. Groble and 
Louwrens [12] presentation did not have any component of 
DFR that was focused towards IoT environments. 
More efforts by Pooe and Labuschagne [13] show that the 
ever-growing threats of fraud and security incidents to law 
enforcement and organizations present many challenges 
across the globe. This situation has brought about the need 
for organizations to build effective incident management 
strategies, which will enhance the company’s reactive 
capability to security incidents. Their study then proposes 
proactive activities an organization can undertake in order to 
increase its ability to respond to security incidents and create 
a digitally forensic ready workplace environment. While 
their research focuses on organizations, it does not mention 
the integration of DFR in IoT environments. 
Abdul et al., [14] state that, as of the time of their study, 
there existed not many discussions on Wireless Body Area 
Network (WBAN) security impact and security threats. For 
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this reason, they propose a practical approach to assessing 
WBAN security impact in order to identify, evaluate, and 
develop a Secure Network Architecture (SNA) complete 
with DFR capability to secure WBAN implementation. Their 
architecture, however, did not focus purely on IoT 
environments as is the case of this paper. Additionally, on 
IoT, Kebande et al., [19] have proposed countermeasures 
that can mitigate the “Smart Refrigerator” being used in a 
clandestine approach to perpetuate cyber-crime. In this study, 
the authors are able to identify a major weakness that “smart 
home appliances” possess. Other research in IoT has 
focussed on public weather and placement of sensor nodes in 
networks that can be used in IoT-based approach [21], [22]. 
In research by Editya, Sumpeno and Pratomo [23], the 
authors tried to use Augmented Reality (AR) to monitor 
Xbee based IoT device. As a result, they found out that, 
there is a different result between ZigBee Protocol and IEEE 
802.14.5 real-time monitoring system. This research too did 
not directly mention the integration of DFR in IoT 
environments as is the case of this paper. 
There also exist other related works on DFR models and 
frameworks, but neither those nor the cited references in this 
paper have presented DFR architecture for IoT environments 
in the way that is introduced in this paper. However, we 
acknowledge the fact that the previously proposed models 
and frameworks have offered useful insights toward the 
development of the architecture for adding DFR to the IoT 
domain in this paper. In the section that follows the authors 
briefly explain the architecture for adding DFR to the IoT 
domain. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section presents the architecture for adding DFR to 
IoT domain as a contribution to how DFR proactive 
processes can be utilized in the IoT-based environment. The 
authors concentrate on discussing the important DFR aspects 
that can forensically prepare an IoT-based environment to be 
able to manage and possibly thwart potential security 
incidents. This has been presented using an architecture 
called DFR for the Internet of Things (DFR-IoT), which is 
presented in two approaches as shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 
respectively. Additionally, based on the functionalities of the 
DFR-IoT, a hypothetical scenario is also discussed in the 
later section of this paper. In order for the DFR-IoT 
architecture to achieve its functionalities, the architecture 
must satisfy the following aspects: 
• Be able to establish a communication mechanism 
through an interconnection that involves Machine-to-
Machine (M-2-M) connectivity. 
• Be able to send and receive data from a source to a 
destination through a well-connected IoT mechanism. 
• Be able to transmit data over the web where it also 
supports the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. 
• Be able to support digital forensic investigative 
capabilities. 
The next subsection will now discuss the high-level view 
of DFR-IoT Architecture. 
 
 
A. High-level Overview of DFR-IoT Architecture 
Fig. 2 shows the high-level view of the architecture which 
is then followed by an all-inclusive DFR-IoT architecture 
that is presented later on in Fig. 3. From Fig. 2, the reader 
can infer that the high-level view of the DFR-IoT 
architecture consists of three distinct entities namely: 
Proactive Process (PP), IoT Communication Mechanism 
(IoT-CM) and Reactive Process (RP).  
 
Fig. 2 High-level view of the DFR-IoT architecture 
The PP deals with pre-incident detection strategies while 
the IoT-CM provides smart communication strategies for the 
M-2-M devices over an intelligent network. Next is the RP 
which is a post-event response process that deals with digital 
investigation processes. Each of the entity has been 
described in detail in the all-inclusive DFR-IoT architecture 
using Fig. 3.  
B. All-inclusive DFR-IoT Architecture 
In this section, the authors present an all-inclusive DFR-
IoT architecture which is an expansion of the initially 
presented high-level architecture shown in Fig. 2. The high-
level architecture in Fig. 2 is divided into three entities, each 
containing a number of modules as shown in the all-
inclusive architecture in Fig. 3. Firstly, the proactive process 
labeled 1 consists of the ISO/IEC 27043 readiness guidelines, 
techniques of implementing readiness, readiness processes 
and readiness reporting. The second process which is labeled 
2, is the IoT mechanism, it consists of IoT Intelligent 
Network (IoT-IN), IoT Operating System (IoT-OS), IoT 
Network Functionalities (IoT-NF), IoT Device Functionality 
(IoT-DF) and IoT devices. The third part of the DFR-IoT is 
the reactive process labeled 3. It is the core Digital Forensic 
Investigation (DFI) part of the architecture, and it consists of 
the investigative part of the ISO/IEC 27043 [5]. It comprises 
of initialization, acquisitive and investigative part. Each of 
the above-mentioned processes in the architecture has been 
explained in detail in the sections that follow. 
1) Proactive Process (PP): The proactive process has 
been represented in the first rectangle of Fig. 3 and labeled 
as 1. It consists of the following modules: readiness 
guidelines, techniques of achieving forensic readiness, 
proposed readiness processes and reporting. Each of the 
proactive process modules has been explained below.  
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• Readiness Guidelines 
Note that the concepts that have been proposed in this 
paper comply and are inclined towards the guidelines that 
have been mentioned in the ISO/IEC 27043 international 
standard which is a standard for information technology-
security techniques-incident investigation principles and 
processes. These guidelines are able to encapsulate different 
models that have been idealized in order for them to enhance 
a practice that allows forensic processes for capturing digital 
evidence for purposes of investigation to be implemented 
(ISO/IEC 27043: 2015). In the context of this paper, the 
author gives a description based on the following readiness 
process groups’ aspects that are highlighted in ISO/IEC 
27043 guidelines. It is important to say that these readiness 
aspects are treated as functional requirements in any 
organization. 
 
 
Fig. 3   DFR-IoT architecture
Planning process group- In the perspective of IoT, this 
group will initiate processes that will define IoT scenarios. 
The group will identify IoT sources of evidence, plan on 
how to gather digital evidence that may contain evidence, 
modes of handling this evidence, analyzing this evidence 
and defining how pre-incident detection process can be 
accomplished. 
Implementation process group- As a result of 
implementing the IoT planning activities, this group will 
provide an implementation of pre-incident gathering process 
and implement the storage techniques in IoT environment 
and also implement the pre-incident analysis of the collected 
PDE from the IoT-based environment. Lastly, an 
implementation of the pre-incident detection process is 
achieved in this group. 
Assessment process group- This group provides an 
assessment of the implementation process group. It ensures 
that the processes conducted in the implementation process 
group are valid and the results of the implementation are 
presented. 
 
• Techniques 
Techniques in the context of this research include modes 
of achieving DFR from IoT-based environments. The 
authors have identified various techniques that can be used 
to perform DFR in order to gather pre-incident information. 
IoT Sensor Monitoring- Monitoring systems like ZigBee 
may be used because it is perceived that they work using 
light sensors, humid sensors, and temperature sensors. These 
aspects can forensically be wirelessly transmitted to a 
centralized center where they can be analyzed for possible 
incidents. 
IoT Device Monitoring- The devices in IoT environment 
can be monitored based on the network packets they send or 
receive. The captured packets can also be forwarded to a 
centralized analysis center. An interpretation of the packets 
can be useful while trying to uncover a given occurrence. 
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For example, devices like microcontrollers, power supply, 
Wi-Fi modules and adapters, Voltage Regulators, Routers 
can be monitored based on how they are interfaced.  
IoT Network Monitoring- Multiple sensors over the 
network and the network protocols can be assessed and 
monitored to ascertain how PDE can be excavated. Network 
services can be monitored too in order for events to be 
extracted. This is an aspect that facilitates the collection of 
the comprehensive amount of data about the functioning of 
the IoT–based networks. The Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSN), Interconnected Sensor Nodes (ISN) and Body 
Sensor Nodes (BSN) can all be monitored so that they can 
act as potential sources of digital forensic information. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)- Systems that are able 
to detect different modes of intrusion should also be put as 
techniques of achieving DFR in IoT based environment. An 
IDS can seamlessly be deployed anywhere in the IoT 
environment to protect the smart environments. The role of 
the IDS would be to send notifications to the administrators 
whenever an attack or suspicious network activities are 
detected. 
False Alarm Detection and Notifications- False alarms 
and their notifications can play an important role in 
preparing the IoT environment for pre-incident detection 
strategies. This is possible because it is evident that a false 
alarm might contain some evidence. In previous research, 
Kebande and Venter [15] [16] have highlighted that to detect 
the frequency through which incidents occur then the false 
alarms should be incorporated. This was presented as 
Equation 1 below:   
Based on the Equation (1), it is very evident that the 
presence of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can generate 
quite a number of alerts. However, it is the user’s task to 
investigate alerts that are real from the alerts that are false, 
and how accurate can an alert be. It is a daunting task which 
is also time-consuming and complicated to be able to filter 
false alarms from a thousand alarms from the collected 
information.  
This brings about the issue of false positives as a result of 
forensic logging, which interestingly is not a new thing to 
the networking domain. More so, there might also be some 
irrelevant logs and irrelevant alarms that are not false 
positive or true positive, evidently such do not require 
attention if there is no vulnerability affected. Significantly, 
being able to filter traffic is a key attribute for the DFR-IoT 
architecture.  
 
 
Where IDR is incident detection rate, No_I_D is the 
number of incidents detected and No_R_I represents the 
number of incidents that are real. False alarms are incidents 
that are not treated to have occurred.  
To highlight this aspect, the authors present a hypothetical 
scenario that has been used to bring out the aspects 
highlighted in Equation 1. 
 
Hypothetical Scenario 
X is an organization under a cyber-attack in a span of one 
week, the attacks that range from intrusion, identity theft, 
malware attacks, SQL injection, Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) and web defacement. The attacks on 
organization X have warranted monitoring connected 
“things” by the security experts from X. The security experts 
are not able to determine what kind of attacks is true and 
which ones are false. As a result, they have come up with a 
technique of computing data that is verified later (as 
explained in Section 4.2.1.2). 
 
TABLE I 
TABLE DEPICTING TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS 
 
S.no Day DDoS Identity Theft Cyber Intrusions SQL Injection Web Defacement Total Incidents 
1 Mon 2 3 4 0 2 11 
2 Tue 1 0 4 1 0 6 
3 Wed 0 0 1 2 0 3 
4 Thu 0 4 5 4 0 13 
5 Fri 2 7 0 0 1 10 
6 Sat 4 10 2 1 2 19 
7 Sun 5 4 8 1 0 13 
  
      
Table 1 shows the number type and number of attacks that 
X has experienced in a span of one week (Monday to 
Sunday). At the last column, the total number of incidents 
for each day is highlighted. Based on the data presented in 
Table 1, there is a need to ascertain whether all the incidents 
are true or not.  
Fig. 4 shows how the incidents appear before detecting 
the false alarms. This shows that by computing the total 
incidents that are detected at a given time, then it is possible 
for one to arrive at the incident response mechanism.  
 
Fig. 4  Graph showing the total number of incidents in a span of one week 
before verifying collected potential evidence 
100*}_{
__
__ AlarmsFalse
IRNo
DINoIDR += (1) 
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• Readiness Processes 
The readiness processes entity that has been presented in 
Fig. 3 has processes that have been proposed to achieve DFR 
in IoT-based environments. The following processes have 
been defined in this entity. Forensic logging, log parsing, log 
preservation, log storage, log analysis and log 
characterization. Each of the processes has been explained in 
sections to follow. 
Forensic logging- Forensic logging allows the collection 
of digital artifacts from the IoT environments. These 
artifacts can be collected by implementing the techniques 
that have been proposed previously. Other tools that can be 
used in the collection of these artifacts can be EnCase, 
Sleuth Kit or FTK. In this context, the researcher has 
proposed the techniques of achieving this process as 
mentioned previously. Artefacts from IoT environment 
should be centered on sensor communication, packet sending 
and receiving, real-time data that can help to create a 
hypothesis that can be used in a court of law to prove or 
disprove facts. 
Log parsing- Generally, logs are used to record 
information that can help to check the behavior of various 
events. Log parsing is a technique of packaging the forensic 
logs that are collected from the IoT-based environment in 
order to mine or extract specific log event. This helps in 
characterization which has been explained later on. The 
main reason for employing log parsing in this context is to 
be able to distinguish essential logs from non-essential log 
based on the content. 
Log preservation- Preservation which is a way of digitally 
encoding logs enables the integrity of the collected 
information to be maintained. This can be done by creating 
hash values of each collected block of logs through hashing 
process. Later on, the hashed logs can be verified by 
comparing the generated hash and the stored hash. This is 
done to avoid tampering and to maintain the originality of 
collected forensic logs. Preservation should be done in such 
a way that the verifier is able to detect the tampered logs and 
the deleted log data. 
If we revisit the hypothetical scenario that has been 
presented in Section (4.2.1.2), the following can be 
conducted after verification by matching the stored hashes 
against the hash values that were stored. The security experts 
discovered the following incidents. (R) has been used to 
denote the Real incidents while (F) has been used to denote 
the False alarms. 
 
 
TABLE II 
TOTAL REAL INCIDENTS AND FALSE ALARMS 
 
No Day DDoS ID Theft Cyber Intrusions SQL Injection Web defacement Total 
  R F R F R F R F R F R F 
1 Mon 1 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 1 1 5 5 
2 Tue 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 3 3 
3 Wed 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 
4 Thu 0 0 2 2 3 2 2 2 0 0 7 6 
5 Frid 3 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 4 
6 Sat 3 1 6 4 1 1 1 0 0 2 11 8 
7 Sun 4 1 3 1 5 3 0 1 0 0 12 6 
  
            
A total of the real incident and false alarms has been 
computed as shown in Table 2. Fig. 5 shows the 
visualization number of real incidents after detecting the 
false alarms.  
 
Fig. 5 .Total weekly real incidents and false alarms 
From the data  on the real incidents and false incidents, it 
is possible to calculate the Incident Detection Rate (IDR) as 
highlighted in Equation (1) as follows. Consider  an example 
for S.no 1 as follows: 
100*)5)
5
11{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentMonday   (2) 
100*)3)
3
6{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentTuesday         (3) 
100*)1)
2
3{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentWednesday
 
 (4) 
100*)6)
7
13{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentThursday   (5) 
7
100*)4)
8
10{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentFriday
 
   (6) 
100*)8)
11
19{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentSaturday     (7) 
100*)6)
12
13{(__)( +=RateDetectionIncidentSunday
 
 (8) 
TABLE III 
INCIDENT DETECTION RATE FOR REAL INCIDENTS AND FALSE ALARMS 
 
S.no Day Total 
Incidents 
Total Real 
and False 
alarms 
Incident 
Detection 
Rate (%) 
   R F  
1 Monday 11 5 5 720 
2 Tuesday 6 3 3 500 
3 Wednesday 3 2 1 250 
4 Thursday 13 7 6 785.71 
5 Friday 10 8 4 525 
6 Saturday 19 11 8 972.72 
7 Sunday 13 12 6 708.33 
 
The graph below depicts the total incidents after the false 
alarms have been detected. 
 
Fig. 6  Graph depicting incident detection rate for real and false alarms 
Log storage- Once hash values for the logs have been 
created the logs are pushed to the forensic database for 
storage. Logs that are stored can be verified or analyzed. 
Storage allows the collected logs to accumulate as a 
centralized location such that if an incident is detected, then 
the logs can be relied upon for the reactive process that is 
labeled 3. 
Log analysis- Analysis helps to check for possible 
security incidents. It allows the checking of PDE to ascertain 
if it contains suspicious events. These events contain 
common datasets that have user behaviors. This is because 
most of the time these logs come when they are unordered, 
analysis helps to group them, for example, based on ID, IP-
address or timestamp for proper analysis.  
Log characterization- This process allows the user to be 
able to tell which log comes from what part of the IoT 
system. Characterisation has been presented by Kebande & 
Venter [17] [20] in their research as a mechanism that can 
shorten the process of DFR by checking the characteristics 
that PDE possesses. By characterizing all the possible 
evidential activities detection is made more effective for 
purposes of digital investigation. 
•  Forensic Readiness Report 
The readiness report is presented as a very integral part of 
the proactive process. It is used to show the outcome of the 
implementation of the readiness processes from the IoT 
environment. This report may at some point highlight the 
causality based on the readiness processes implementation. 
 
•  Procedural Flows for the Proactive Phase 
 
Fig. 7 shows the basic interaction of functional elements 
of the proactive phase which has been presented as a 
readiness phase. It consists of five modules namely, 
readiness guidelines, techniques, readiness process and 
reporting stage. The obligation of the readiness processes 
that have been highlighted is to forensically prepare the IoT-
based environment.  
We consider that each process is enforced, for instance, 
each process at least requires interacting with the other 
processes that make a request. Additionally, we consider that 
each service of the process flow plays an active role in the 
DFR-IoT architecture. 
 
2) IoT Communication Mechanism:  
The IoT communication mechanism entity is used to 
facilitate communication between the network operating 
system and the IoT devices; this has been shown in the 
square labeled as 2 of Fig. 2. The mechanism allows data to 
move across the various channels. For example, power 
devices, IP connectivity, the functionality of components 
and node communication are some examples that enable 
communication of IoT mechanism. The IoT communication 
mechanism consists of the following modules: IoT 
Intelligent Network (IoT-IN), IoT Operating System (IoT-
OS), IoT Network Functionalities (IoT-NF), IoT Device 
Functionalities (IoT-DF) and IoT services. Each of the 
aforementioned modules has been explained in detail below. 
• IoT Intelligent Network 
Intelligent network paves the way for the functionalities 
of nodes to be distributed in a flexible manner such that the 
Operating System (OS) and the devices are able to 
communicate in order for the IoT tasks to be achieved. IoT-
IN should incorporate network elements so that the behavior 
of the IoT devices and functionalities can be supported. IoT-
IN should address the following aspects: 
ο The IoT-based services that are able to be supported 
by the connected IoT environment. 
ο It should be able to trigger the processes and be able 
to interact with the calling and called processes. 
ο Should provide a mechanism through which 
processes are called. 
ο It should be able to link to the network functions and 
resources [18] 
• IoT Operating System 
The IoT-OS provides an interface that allows the IoT 
functionalities to be implemented since a majority of IoT 
devices are embedded devices that possess wireless sensors. 
The IoT-OS supports scheduling given that there are many 
applications running and the time constraint is also limited. 
The IoT-OS is meant to support network functions of IoT 
devices.  Through the OS it is bound to support WSN 
protocols, Bluetooth, Z-Wave, Zigbee, IPV6 routing 
protocols for purposes of seamless communication of large 
networks. 
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Fig. 7  Procedural flows for the proactive phase of the DFR-IoT 
 
• IoT Network Functionalities 
The IoT-NF establishes gateway that is able to provide the 
connectivity of the embedded devices using the IPV6 
connectivity. For example, the M-2-M devices are able to 
establish a protocol that allows them to exchange 
information in real-time basis over the network domain. 
 
• IoT Device Functionalities 
IoT-DF allows the connected devices to communicate 
seamlessly by relying on the interface provided by IoT-OS 
and the IoT-IN.  In this section, the actuators play a role in 
making the devices and the M-2-M to communicate. 
Information about every connected device is provided at this 
phase, and a device management process can help to 
configure and reconfigure the functionalities over the IoT-
OS. 
• IoT Services 
The IoT services are bound to provide information about 
all the IoT-based components that are connected to the DFR-
IoT architecture. For example, the IoT Services is tasked 
with handling the following tasks: Security of the 
architecture and components, device communication, 
authenticity of data being communicated and remote service 
management. 
 
3) Reactive Process 
 
The reactive process provides core Digital Forensic 
Investigation (DFI) process. This has been presented in the 
last square that is labeled 3 of Fig. 2. These are processes 
that rely on the outcome of the proactive processes that have 
previously been highlighted in Section 4.2 of this research 
paper. It is worth noting again that the processes in the 
reactive process have also been mentioned in the ISO/IEC 
27043 international standards [5].  The core digital 
investigation processes mentioned in the DFR-IoT 
architecture are as follows: 
• Initialisation process: Whenever there is Potential 
Digital Evidence (PDE), there is always need to 
commence an investigation. Therefore, initialization 
process deals with procedures for commencing an 
investigation whenever an incident is detected. This is 
done by handling the post-event response mechanism 
as a first response and initializing incident detection, 
planning and preparing a digital investigation 
process. 
• Acquisitive Process: This is a process that is 
concerned with how PDE is acquired from the IoT-
based environment. This process concentrates on 
looking how PDE is identified, techniques that are 
used to collect these evidence, how this evidence is 
handled and under which condition this evidence is 
preserved and stored. 
• Investigative Process: Once an incident is detected in 
IoT environment, it is important to identify the 
causality through proper examination and analysis of 
collected PDE. The process reports the activities that 
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have occurred in IoT environment through an 
interpretation process. The process interprets the 
activities that have occurred as a result of an incident 
which is later presented as a hypothesis in a court of 
law.  
C. Discussions of the Propositions 
The authors have explored the IoT domain, and it is 
evident that from a security perspective, there are research 
gaps that exist. The authors have carried out a study on the 
easiest way through which an IoT-based environment can 
prepare for potential security incidents. The study presented 
in this paper would help various researchers in the IoT and 
forensic community to understand that there are strategies 
that can be able to thwart cyber-attacks in IoT environments. 
DFR has a very important aspect in the modern day 
organizations; this is because it is the only way that an IoT-
enabled environment can minimize the potential use of 
digital evidence while minimizing the cost of conducting a 
DFI. Compared to the conventional computing devices, IoT 
has special features which make it important for an IoT 
environment to be forensically ready for possible cyber-
attacks and intrusions.  
The mode of operation of the DFR-IoT presents it as a 
proactively based technique that employs proposed ISO/IEC 
27043 International standard in implementing the readiness 
techniques. The ever-rising demand for smart homes and 
smart environments in general means that adversaries might 
also want to target these environments. It is based on this 
premise that the authors think that adding DFR as a security 
component to IoT might help in pre-incident detection 
strategies. The proposed architecture allows the intelligent 
network to work hand in hand with the IoT communication 
mechanism in order for all the proposed functions to be 
achieved. 
Taking a closer look at the hypothetical scenario that has 
been presented in section X, one is able to deduce that 
implementing readiness aspects can accurately increase the 
chances of pre-incident detection. This is because, the rate at 
which the total number of incidents, real incidents, and false 
alarms occur can easily be computed in order to distinguish 
the nature of the occurrence. Note that this computation can 
only occur if the readiness techniques are implemented in 
the IoT environment. Ultimately, this leads to the reactive 
process that is characterized by examination and analysis. It 
is worth noting again that reactive process in the context of 
this paper differs in terms of wording with the presentation 
of ISO/IEC 27043 which is presented as a DFI. However 
roles remain to be the same. 
After having presented the hypothetical scenario, it is 
quite clear that any organization should consider the 
readiness processes as a business requirement (Rowlingson, 
2004). This aspect can only be consolidated based on the 
readiness processes that have been defined together with the 
roles, which have presented relationships between the 
entities, functionalities, and modules. As mentioned earlier, 
it becomes realistic enough for one to be able to distinguish 
real incidents from false alarms, which means that the 
propositions presented in Fig. 1 is entities that every existing 
organization should consider. 
On the basis of the mapping that we did with the ISO/IEC 
27043 guidelines, the DFR-IOT architecture is able to be 
mapped with the readiness process groups namely planning 
implementation and assessment and the reactive processes 
namely initialization, acquisitive and implementation. The 
biggest advantage as compared to any other architecture is 
the aspect of usability in an organization and being able to 
use standardized processes thereof. 
Besides, enterprises running services and applications 
over the cloud can be able to technically implement these 
processes without having to disrupt the business processes. 
The next section presents a conclusion and future work.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The study has proposed the addition of DFR to the smart 
environments of IoT by employing standardized processes 
that have been mentioned in the ISO/IEC 27043 
international standard. This has been done with the 
convenience that allows the IoT-based environment to be 
forensically prepared for possible cybersecurity incidents. 
The proposed DFR-IoT architecture starts from the readiness 
guidelines, and then moves to techniques, readiness 
processes and reporting phase. Thereafter, the author 
describes the IoT communication mechanism and the 
reactive process. It is expected that the proposed architecture 
can be very useful when applied in smart IoT platforms. 
For future work, the authors plan to propose the 
functional requirements that are needed in order to fully 
implement the DFR-IoT in a smart environment, based on 
this aspect; a prototype would provide proof of the 
propositions. Also, the authors will be able to come up with 
propositions that will allow organizations to be able to 
customize the architecture in order for the proposed 
processes to fit their organizational structures.  
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